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• Andrew J. Ferrent
John Hinckley, Jr.'s acquittal by reason of insanity for the at-
tempted assassination of President Reagan outraged many observ-
ers. Crucial to the success of Hinckley's insanity plea was the trial
court's exclusion of "demeanor"' testimony offered by two FBI
agents who had unlawfully interrogated Hinckley without the pres-
ence of the attorney he had requested.2 The D.C. Circuit affirmed
the exclusion of that evidence on Fifth Amendment grounds.3 Spe-
cifically, the court rejected the government's arguments for a
waiver of Fifth Amendment protection and, alternatively, for a
new insanity rebuttal exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated
in Miranda v Arizona.4
Six years later, the Eleventh Circuit refused to apply Hinckley
when it upheld the admission of police demeanor testimony in
Jones v Dugger.5 The court held that the prosecution could pre-
sent a police detective's opinion testimony to rebut Jones's in-
sanity defense, despite Miranda violations, where the detective
never revealed Jones's specific statements and gave no indication
that his opinion was based on the substance of Jones's story.6 Even
though five expert witnesses agreed that Jones suffered from seri-
ous mental illness,7 the jury apparently relied on the officer's lay
t A.B. 1986, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1991, The University of Chicago.
I Judicial opinions typically do not define demeanor evidence. This Comment treats
demeanor as any bodily evidence other than verbal statements used for their content. De-
meanor therefore includes the manner in which a suspect speaks as well as non-verbal as-
pects of his voluntary or involuntary behavior and appearance. See text at notes 84-86.
2 United States v Hinckley, 529 F Supp 520, 522 (D DC 1982) (Amended Statement of
Reasons), clarifying 525 F Supp 1342 (D DC 1981).
3 United States v Hinckley, 672 F2d 115 (DC Cir 1982).
' 384 US 436 (1966).
5 839 F2d 1441 (11th Cir 1988).
6 Id at 1444.
7 Id at 1453 (Clark dissenting).
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opinion, as well as the presumption of sanity," in deciding to con-
vict Jones.9
This Comment explores the extent to which a law enforcement
officer should be permitted to testify about a defendant's sanity
when his knowledge stems from observations of the defendant's
demeanor made during a custodial interrogation lacking required
procedural safeguards. Two kinds of testimony are at issue: opin-
ions about the defendant's sanity and observations of the defen-
dant's demeanor. Even if a police witness were prevented from
stating his opinion about the defendant's sanity, timely police ob-
servations could corroborate, or serve as a basis for, later expert
diagnoses. 10 Such testimony, based on observations at or immedi-
ately after the time of the alleged crime, may be considerably more
persuasive than expert medical opinion testimony based on belated
observations. 1
Before considering the admissibility of police testimony, this
Comment discusses the scope of the Fifth Amendment exclusion-
ary rule. Section I lays out the current doctrinal approach to the
admissibility of evidence under the Fifth Amendment's self-in-
crimination clause. Section II discusses the contrasting applica-
tions of these principles by the courts in Hinckley and Jones. The
Comment identifies four theories the prosecution might advance in
response to a defense motion to suppress police testimony offered
to prove sanity. Initially, the prosecution could argue that the
Fifth Amendment does not apply because either (1) no evidence of
sanity is "incriminating," or (2) the police testimony at issue in-
volves only "real," not "testimonial," evidence. Alternatively, the
prosecution could argue that even if the evidence is both incrimi-
nating and testimonial, (3) the defendant waived Fifth Amend-
ment protection by pleading and attempting to prove insanity, or
(4) the evidence should be admitted under a new insanity rebuttal
exception to the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule.
' In all jurisdictions a defendant is presumed sane until he places his sanity in issue.
See Michael L. Perlin, 3 Mental Disability Law § 15.12 at 320 (Michie, 1989).
See Jones, 839 F2d at 1453 (Clark dissenting).
10 See Welsh S. White, The Psychiatric Examination and the Fifth Amendment Privi-
lege in Capital Cases, 74 J Crim L & Criminol 943, 944 n 5 (1983), citing cases admitting
such derivative opinions. See also FRE 703. In many jurisdictions, an expert may not state
an opinion as to sanity where sanity is an element of the crime or of a defense, but may
explain why he believes the defendant was or was not able to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct. See, for example, FRE 704(b).
" See Richard M. Daley and Inge Fryklund, The Insanity Defense and the "Testi-
mony By Proxy" Problem, 21 Valp U L Rev 497, 501 (1987); Edward B. Beis, Mental
Health and the Law 280 (Aspen, 1984).
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Section III considers the applicability of the Fifth Amendment
to police-obtained evidence of sanity. It argues that all evidence of
sanity is incriminating, and that demeanor evidence of sanity is
testimonial when obtained by virtue of the officer's psychiatric ex-
pertise. Section IV rejects the arguments that either a waiver ex-
ception or an insanity rebuttal exception to the exclusionary rule
can be applied to this type of evidence.
The Comment thus extends the testimonial evidence test to
the insanity defense context and concludes that courts should bar
all police-compelled evidence that is testimonial. Under the pro-
posed standard, police officers may not state their opinions con-
cerning the defendant's sanity, but courts may permit lay officers
to relate observations of the defendant's nontestimonial demeanor.
Expert officers would be prevented from testifying even about the
defendant's demeanor because their observation method violates
the privilege against self-incrimination.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In Miranda, the Supreme Court announced the Fifth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule: statements obtained during custodial in-
terrogation absent prescribed warnings and a valid waiver (or
equally effective procedural safeguards) are constitutionally inad-
missible at trial.12 This rule derives from the command that "[n]o
person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.""3 Thus, unlike its judicially created Fourth
Amendment counterpart,14 the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule
is constitutionally mandated: "[t]he Fifth Amendment... is by its
terms an exclusionary rule .. .
The constitutional text does not further explain the scope of
this privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda clarified that the
privilege attaches not only at trials but during pre-trial custodial
12 384 US at 444, 476.
13 US Const, Amend V. The privilege against self-incrimination applies to state as well
as federal proceedings. Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1, 8 (1964); Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US
420, 428 (1984). Similarly, the exclusionary rule applies to the states. Mapp v Ohio, 367 US
643, 655 (1961).
" The Fourth Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches and seizures,
thereby securing privacy and property rights. The corresponding exclusionary rule was first
enunciated in Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 398 (1914), and its judicially created
status has been reaffirmed in Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 482, 486 (1976).
15 United States v Kurzer, 534 F2d 511, 516 (2d Cir 1976). See also Arnold H. Loewy,
Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Ob-
tained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 Mich L Rev 907, 926 (1989).
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interrogations as well.16 Yet, other applications of the self-incrimi-
nation clause remain controversial. This Section sets forth the rele-
vant prerequisites and exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
A. Prerequisites to the Exclusionary Rule
Three prerequisites must coincide before a pre-trial custodial
interrogation triggers the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule. A
defendant who moves to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in
violation of his privilege must establish that it was compelled, in-
criminating, and testimonial. 17 Because this Comment posits a cus-
todial interrogation in which the defendant's responses are "com-
pelled,""8 it explores only the "incrimination" and "testimonial"
requirements.
1. "Incrimination": Smith's extension of Miranda to capital
sentencing.
"Incriminating" evidence is not limited to evidence that estab-
lishes factual guilt. In Estelle v Smith,1 9 for example, the Court
extended the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule to statements
the prosecution obtained during a custodial psychiatric examina-
tion and then sought to use at a murder trial's sentencing phase.
The Court explained that the availability of the privilege against
self-incrimination depends not on the type of proceeding, but on
the nature of the evidence and the exposure it invites.20
Leaving open the possibility that a defendant might waive the
privilege by claiming insanity, the Smith Court concluded that
"[a] criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evalua-
tion nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not
be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be
used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding. ' 2 The jury's
finding of dangerousness warranting death was as serious as its
finding of guilt because Smith's dangerousness dictated the sever-
1" 384 US at 461, citing Brain v United States, 168 US 532, 542 (1897).
1 See, for example, Baltimore City Dept. of Social Services v Bouknight, 110 S Ct 900,
904 (1990).
18 In the usual custodial interrogation, compulsion is presumed in the absence of Mi-
randa warnings.
1 451 US 454 (1981).
'o Id at 462, quoting In re Gault, 387 US 1, 49 (1967) (privilege may be invoked in
juvenile delinquency proceeding with potential commitment to reform school).
21 Id at 468.
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ity of his punishment. The Fifth Amendment's protection against
self-incrimination therefore applied.
2. "Testimonial": Schmerber's distinction between "real"
and "testimonial" evidence.
Although one could read the self-incrimination clause literally
to cover any incriminating evidence supplied by a suspect, courts
have traditionally construed it more narrowly. The Court's 5-4 de-
cision in Schmerber v California22 confirmed that certain physical
evidence is not subject to the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule.
While the state may not compel a suspect to testify against himself
or otherwise provide testimonial or communicative evidence, the
state may force him to supply "real or physical evidence. 23
In Schmerber, the Court upheld the use of a compelled blood
test in a prosecution for drunk driving. Justice Brennan's majority
opinion conceded that a suspect may refuse not only to testify but
also to provide the state with testimonial evidence,24 which may
include communicative responses in the form of acts or words.25
The Court also indicated in dictum that some tests (such as lie
detector tests) that attempt to discover the suspect's knowledge of
guilt by measuring his physiological responses to questioning im-
plicate the Fifth Amendment.2 6 But compelled submission to the
gathering of physical evidence would not involve the suspect's
communicative capacities in any way. Schmerber's forcibly ex-
tracted blood, though incriminating, was not testimonial evidence
because his mental participation was irrelevant to the test
results.
B. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
Even if compelled, incriminating, and testimonial, some ille-
gally obtained evidence may be admissible under either of two ex-
ceptions to the exclusionary rule.28 First, some courts have adopted
22 384 US 757 (1966).
23 Id at 764.
24 Id at 761.
Id at 761 n 5 (acknowledging that a nod or head-shake may be as testimonial or
communicative as spoken words). See also id at 763.
26 Id at 764.
17 Id at 765.
2" Other exceptions include using tainted evidence to locate a witness, Michigan v
Tucker, 417 US 433, 450 (1974), and using it as the basis for questioning in a grand jury
proceeding when the witness is granted use immunity, United States u Calandra, 414 US
8, 346, 351-52 (1974). In neither case is the evidence used directly to convict a suspect.
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a "waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence" doctrine,29 in which a
defendant who pleads and attempts to prove insanity must consent
to the prosecution's compulsion and use of expert psychiatric testi-
mony in rebuttal. These courts have sidestepped Smith and the
issues of whether psychiatric testimony is really incriminating and
testimonial by holding that, once a defendant offers expert evi-
dence in support of an insanity defense, he opens the door to ex-
pert rebuttal evidence, even if the prosecution obtained that evi-
dence in violation of Miranda.30 Proponents of this "waiver by
offer of psychiatric evidence" doctrine argue that the fairness con-
cerns of the adversarial system burden the right to present psychi-
atric testimony, and that the opportunity to cross-examine the de-
fendant's expert witnesses does not sufficiently honor these
fairness concerns."'
A second, more general exception to the exclusionary rule is
the impeachment exception. A statement inadmissible against the
defendant in the prosecution's case-in-chief because of a Miranda
violation may be used to impeach the testifying defendant's credi-
bility if the statement satisfies legal standards of trustworthiness.32
Absent evidence of compulsion,3 the Fourth Amendment test of
balancing the public interest in truth at trial against the individual
interest in privacy applies in the Fifth Amendment context.3 4
When combined with a testimony-by-proxy theory, 5 the impeach-
29 White, 74 J Crim L & Criminol at 950 (cited in note 10).
30 See, for example, Isley v Dugger, 877 F2d 47, 49-50 (11th Cir 1989); Granviel v
Lynaugh, 881 F2d 185, 190 (5th Cir 1989), cert denied 110 S Ct 2577 (1990); United States
v Madrid, 673 F2d 1114, 1120-21 (10th Cir 1982); People v Gacy, 125 I1 2d 117, 530 NE2d
1340, 1351 (1988); and People v Poggi, 45 Cal 3d 306, 753 P2d 1082, 1097 (1988). This
theory is analogous to the testimonial waiver doctrine in the law of evidence, under which a
defendant who testifies in court opens himself to cross-examination within the scope of his
direct testimony.
'3 White, 74 J Crim L & Criminol at 956 (cited in note 10).
32 Harris v New York, 401 US 222, 224 (1971), relying on Walder v United States, 347
US 62, 65 (1954) (defendant's direct testimony opened door for prosecution to impeach de-
fendant with evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
3' The impeachment exception is unavailable only when the defendant can show com-
pulsion affirmatively, beyond the presumption created by custody and interrogation alone.
See Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 398-402 (1978).
3 See also Oregon v Hass, 420 US 714, 722 (1975) (extending Harris to case in which
defendant was told his rights and requested lawyer, but police questioning continued in
violation of Miranda); United States v Havens, 446 US 620 (1980) (allowing prosecutors to
use illegally obtained evidence to impeach statements defendant made for the first time on
cross-examination).
31 The testimony-by-proxy theory posits that the defendant's expert witness takes the
stand and relates the defendant's statements, some of which may concern the defendant's
version of the crime, as foundation for the expert's opinion.
r'-v' ~ r ~ - - - -
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ment exception might support a narrow insanity rebuttal exception
to the exclusionary rule.
II. CONTRASTING APPLICATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Two federal appellate courts have dealt directly with the ques-
tions addressed in this Comment. Although the cases are techni-
cally reconcilable, they send mixed signals about the admissibility
of police testimony to rebut an insanity defense. They also indicate
the complexity and importance of this issue.36
A. Hinckley
FBI agents interrogated Hinckley before his requested attor-
ney arrived.3 7 The district court granted Hinckley's motion to sup-
press his statements and the fruits thereof.38 Later, the court is-
sued a statement explaining that its earlier ruling also precluded
"any demeanor testimony by the agents concerning the manner in
which Hinckley responded to their questions, as well as their per-
ception of his responses."' 9 The jury subsequently acquitted
Hinckley by reason of insanity.
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the government contended that
even if the evidence from the interrogation was obtained unconsti-
tutionally, the court nevertheless should admit it for the limited
purpose of rebutting the insanity defense. First, the government
argued that Smith permits the prosecution to compel a defendant
who has put his sanity in issue to submit to a psychiatric exam.
The court, however, distinguished the psychiatric exam with its at-
tendant safeguards from the general use of illegally obtained lay
testimony to rebut insanity.40 And while conceding certain other
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the court rejected the govern-
ment's waiver argument. The court maintained that the deterrence
36 Hinckley and Jones are discussed in detail in Note, The Admissibility of Mental
State Observations Obtained During Unlawful Custodial Interrogation: Drawing the Line
on the Real or Physical Evidence Distinction, 30 BC L Rev 1029, 1047-58 (1989), which
argues that Jones was wrongly decided because all mental state observations, as a unitary
group, categorically belong to the testimonial evidence class. The author analyzes "mental
status" evidence, not "demeanor" evidence, which might be considered a subset of the for-
mer category. In addition, the author focuses only on the distinction between real and testi-
monial evidence, and does not distinguish evidence obtained by law enforcement officers
from evidence obtained by psychiatrists and other mental health experts.
37 672 F2d at 119-21.
" 525 F Supp at 1351, 1358.
3 529 F Supp at 522.
" 672 F2d at 133 n 116.
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rationale remains important whenever government agents can an-
ticipate both the use of an insanity defense and the concurrent role
of demeanor evidence. 41
Second, the government offered the testimony-by-proxy the-
ory to support an insanity rebuttal exception to the exclusionary
rule. The court dismissed this theory on the ground that insanity is
indistinguishable from other affirmative defenses to which the re-
buttal theory would not apply.42 Thus, the court rejected both the
proposed extension of the waiver doctrine and the proposed in-
sanity rebuttal exception to the exclusionary rule.
B. Jones
Over two hours after a police detective began interrogating
Jones in custody, Jones cried and confessed to robbery, kidnap-
ping, and sexual battery. When he was finally found competent at
his third pretrial competency hearing, Jones moved to suppress his
statements on the ground that he had not intelligently waived his
Miranda rights. The trial court excluded the statements but, over
Jones's objection, allowed the police detective to state both his ob-
servations of Jones's demeanor and his opinion that Jones was
sane. Following conviction, affirmance," and habeas corpus denial,
the case reached the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Eleventh Circuit majority decided that the Schmerber
real evidence distinction controlled Jones's case. The detective
never related any specific statements made by Jones and, in partic-
ular, never stated that Jones confessed to the crimes. In addition,
he gave no indication that his opinion of Jones's sanity was based
on the details of Jones's statements. "None of these observations
related to the substance of Jones' story," the court concluded.
"[T]hey were more like demeanor evidence, observations that
Jones was alert and comprehending." 44 Despite the absence of pos-
itive proof that the detective's opinion did not in fact rest on the
details of Jones's remarks, the majority believed that a defendant's
statements and demeanor could be separated in determining their
admissibility.
' Id at 133 & n 117. Thus, the court accepted the idea that the deterrence rationale
applies to the Fifth as well as the Fourth Amendment. Contrast Loewy, 87 Mich L Rev at
926-28 (cited in note 15).
42 672 F2d at 134.
4' Jones v State, 465 S2d 1330 (Fla App 1985).
" 839 F2d at 1445.
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In" dissent, Judge Clark dismissed the majority's analogy to the
real evidence admitted in Schmerber, and argued that Smith and
related decisions invalidated any attempt to parse the detective's
testimony so as to render him a source of real evidence.45 Clark
found it inconceivable that the detective did not base his testi-
mony on Jones's communicative acts.46 The judge also opined that
a communication need not relate the substance of what the declar-
ant has said in order to be testimonial. Rather, the testimonial
threshold was satisfied because the interrogator's questions to the
defendant were diagnostic; they enabled the interrogator to mea-
sure and evaluate the defendant's physical and oral responses. 47
Judge Clark also based his conclusion on the detective's status
as a lay observer. The views of an observer without psychiatric
training, he argued, necessarily depend largely on what the suspect
says, especially when the purpose of the interview is to discover
the crime's details.4 Here, Clark argued, the detective was not the
"detached, clinical observer" the majority portrayed him to be.
But neither Judge Clark nor the majority addressed the admissi-
bility of lay or expert police testimony relating only discrete obser-
vations of sane behavior and appearance without stating con-
clusory opinions.
While the Hinckley court was preoccupied with criticizing the
government's proposed waiver and insanity rebuttal exceptions to
the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule, the Jones majority
reached only the real/testimonial evidence distinction. Demeanor
evidence might have been admitted in Hinckley if the government
had not also insisted on introducing Hinckley's statements. Simi-
larly, if there had been any substantive support for Judge Clark's
assumption that the detective's opinions rested on Jones's state-
ments, then the Jones majority's real/testimonial distinction would
have been difficult to make.49 But even if Hinckley and Jones can
technically be reconciled, the two cases together confuse the scope
of admissible police testimony concerning a defendant's sanity.
5 Id at 1446 (Clark dissenting).
11 Id at 1447 (Clark dissenting).
47 Id at 1448 (Clark dissenting).
18 Id at 1449-50 (Clark dissenting).
49 Another important factual distinction between Hinckley and Jones may have been
be relative expertise of the interrogators. See text at notes 87-92.
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III. POLICE-OBTAINED SANITY EVIDENCE AND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT
Consistent with the self-incrimination jurisprudence outlined
above, police testimony offered to prove sanity might be admissible
under several theories. Such evidence could be admissible if it fails
to implicate the Fifth Amendment, on the ground that it is either
not "incriminating" or not "testimonial." Or, even if the evidence
is both incriminating and testimonial, it might be admitted under
either a waiver theory or a new insanity rebuttal exception to the
Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule.
The remainder of this Comment addresses these theories in
turn. Some police testimony offered to prove sanity implicates the
Fifth Amendment because all such evidence is incriminating and
some of it is testimonial. After this Section offers a standard to
determine when such evidence is testimonial, Section IV of the
Comment rejects application of either the waiver theory or the in-
sanity rebuttal exception in exclusionary rule analysis for police
testimony.
A. The Incriminating Character of Sanity Evidence
Some courts have avoided the complex inquiry into whether
particular evidence of sanity is testimonial by holding that evi-
dence of sanity is never incriminating within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment." Others have maintained that the defendant
can raise the privilege against self-incrimination to exclude sanity
evidence.5 1 The better view treats sanity evidence as incriminating
because it affects a defendant's ultimate disposition.52
Smith implies that courts should consider sanity evidence in-
criminating as long as it affects the severity or quality of the de-
fendant's punishment. In reasoning that a post-guilt determination
of dangerousness warranted continued Fifth Amendment protec-
tion, the Smith Court relied on In re Gault, which had emphasized
that the scope of the privilege depends on the defendant's poten-
50 See, for example, DeVine v Solem, 815 F2d 1205, 1207 (8th Cir 1987); People v Nel-
son, 92 Ill App 3d 35, 415 NE2d 688, 693 (1980), and cases cited therein.
5' See, for example, Walker v Butterworth, 599 F2d 1074, 1084 (1st Cir 1979); People v
Flores, 55 Cal App 3d 118, 127 Cal Rptr 230, 232 (1976).
2 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve the lower courts' division on this issue. Some-
what surprisingly, Hinckley, Jones, and many other decisions ignore the incrimination pre-
requisite to the exclusionary rule and rely on other grounds. Numerous courts apparently
have assumed, without deciding, that sanity evidence is incriminating. See, for example,
Brown v Butler, 876 F2d 427, 429-30 (5th Cir 1989).
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tial exposure. 3 The Gault Court disregarded the civil label on a
juvenile delinquency proceeding because a determination of delin-
quency would result in commitment to a state institution. Whether
labeled civil or criminal, such a commitment results in a depriva-
tion of liberty.5 4 Similarly, a defendant who is found sane faces
prison (or even death), a more severe deprivation of liberty than
the hospitalization that awaits the insane defendant. 55
A minority of courts have stated that evidence of sanity is in-
criminating. In United States v Byers, for example, then-Judge
Scalia stated in a plurality opinion of the D.C. Circuit sitting en
banc that rebutting the insanity defense to obtain a conviction is
like finding the dangerousness necessary to impose the death pen-
alty.56 Dissenting on other grounds, Judge Bazelon asserted that if
sanity is a condition of criminal liability, then sanity evidence is
incriminating whether it arises at the determination of guilt or
sanction.57
Many decisions holding that sanity evidence is not incriminat-
ing offer little analysis, but one may glean four rebuttable argu-
ments for this position from the cases. First, a prosecutor might
argue that "incriminate" literally means "to show guilt," in the
sense that the defendant actually did the criminal act with which
he is charged.5 8 Such a construction would exclude sanity. But the
Constitution does not use the word "incriminate," which is simply
Smith, 451 US at 462, citing Gault, 387 US at 49.
Gault, 387 US at 50. Despite Gault, most courts hold that sanity is not incriminating
in the context of involuntary civil commitment. See, for example, In re Bobo, 376 NW2d
429, 433-34 (Minn App 1985); People v Keith, 38 Ill 2d 405, 231 NE2d 387, 390 (1967).
Courts disagree on whether denial or revocation of parole or probation implicates the Fifth
Amendment. Contrast Williams v Turner, 702 F Supp 1439, 1448 (W D Mo 1988), aff'd as
Lombardo v United States, 865 F2d 155 (7th Cir 1989) (implicated), with State v Sites, 231
Neb 624, 437 NW2d 166, 168 (1989) (not implicated).
11 In Wainwright v Greenfield, 474 US 284, 295 (1986), the Supreme Court held that
use of a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence as evidence of his sanity violated the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This holding expanded the application of
Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610 (1976), in which the use of post-Miranda silence as evidence of
guilt was held to violate the implicit assurance contained in the Miranda warnings that
silence carries no penalty. If the Court was willing to extend the Doyle principle to the
sanity phase of a trial, it should be willing similarly to extend the Smith principle.
86 740 F2d 1104, 1113 (DC Cir 1984) (en banc) (plurality opinion).
"' Id at 1150 (Bazelon dissenting). The North Carolina Supreme Court recently fol-
lowed the Byers interpretation of Smith, rejecting "non-incrimination" as a basis for admit-
ting sanity evidence because that theory was "implicitly rejected in Smith." State v Huff,
325 NC 1, 381 SE2d 635, 660 n 9 (1989), cert granted and judgment as to sentencing vacated
and remanded on other gounds, 110 S Ct 3266 (1990).
58 In Counselman v Hitchcock, the Court explained that the privilege against self-in-
crimination was intended to cover testimony that shows that the declarant had "committed
a crime." 142 US 547, 562 (1892).
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a judicial label for the privilege. Being a witness against oneself,
therefore, could readily include any action that goes to one's crimi-
nal culpability.
Second, the prosecution might argue that sanity evidence does
not prove guilt (including mens rea) in those jurisdictions where it
is not an element of the crime. And evidence that does not show
guilt does not contribute to conviction.59 This distinction between
the state's initial burden of proving its case and a later finding of
sanity seems unpersuasive in light of Smith, however. Smith's
death sentence was based on a finding of future dangerousness,
which was not an element of guilt. If the Court was willing to ex-
tend Fifth Amendment protection to sentencing, it should not
matter whether sanity is an element of the crime. After all, few
would argue that because self-defense, like insanity, is an affirma-
tive defense, the defendant's statement "I knew the victim would
not attack" is not incriminating.
A third, related argument is that, unlike the dangerousness is-
sue in Smith, sanity does not help the state punish but merely de-
termines the moral basis for imposing punishment. Only after such
a determination can the court decide the actual penalty. 0 This ar-
gument is transparent because, regardless of the stage at which
sanity becomes an issue, sanity does determine punishment. Delay-
ing the sentencing decision until after a determination of the de-
fendant's sanity does not change the reality that insane persons
generally go to hospitals, but sane persons go to prison-or are
executed.
Finally, the prosecutor might argue that because the defen-
dant's liberty will be restricted either in a hospital or in a prison,
excluding the evidence of sanity does not harm the defendant, and
thus, in this context, the court may disregard the privilege.6 ' This
argument completely ignores qualitative differences in incarcera-
tion.6 2 Hospitalization almost certainly is less harmful to the in-
sane acquittee when the alternative for the sane convict is capital
11 See, for example, White v United States, 451 A2d 848, 852 (DC App 1982); People v
Baker, 210 Cal App 3d 681, 258 Cal Rptr 621, 633 (1989) (observing that the state shoulders
its burden to prove its case without the defendant's help before reaching the sanity issue),
vacated and transferred for reconsideration on other grounds, 262 Cal Rptr 385 (Cal 1989).
60 White, 451 A2d at 853.
61 See Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric
Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 Harv L Rev 648,
665 (1970).
2 In addition, it ignores the trend in the Supreme Court's reasoning reflected in Green-
field, 474 US at 295. See note 55.
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punishment or life imprisonment with no possibility of parole. As
the insanity defense is more likely to be raised when a defendant
faces such dire consequences, this comparison should be quite per-
suasive in many cases.
But the comparative harm rationale also applies where the in-
cremental harm from a finding of sanity is smaller. For example,
crucial evidence that increases an offense from manslaughter to
murder surely qualifies as incriminating. In such a case, the num-
ber of years in jail would be increased. No prosecutor would argue
that evidence producing this result is not incriminating because
the defendant would be convicted of at least the lesser included
crime and would be imprisoned on that basis alone. Likewise, evi-
dence that rebuts an insanity defense and exposes the defendant
to harmful prison conditions should be deemed incriminating. An
insane person will probably receive less severe punishment in a
hospital than does a convicted person in a prison. Hospital confine-
ment may be shorter, and the inmate, in addition to receiving the
necessary medical attention, may find the hospital environment
more pleasant. 3 Furthermore, if the self-incrimination clause is
viewed as a trial right, the prosecutor's argument mistakenly col-
lapses the possible outcomes. Evidence of sanity leads to convic-
tion and away from a not guilty by reason of insanity finding or
from complete acquittal and hence must be seen as incriminating.
B. A Testimonial Standard for Police-obtained Sanity Evidence
Once a court concludes that sanity evidence is incriminating,
it must decide whether the particular police testimony at issue is
based on testimonial evidence. This discussion first presents the
prevailing testimonial evidence test and its rationale. Next, it of-
fers a way to extend this test to police-obtained evidence of sanity.
The Comment concludes that evidence should be considered testi-
monial whenever the government interrogator uses expertise to ex-
tract from the suspect's mind information that tends to show his
sanity. Demeanor evidence is thus testimonial when acquired by a
police officer with psychological expertise.
As applied to various types of police testimony, this test re-
quires that courts prevent expert officers from stating not only
their opinions about the defendant's mental state, but also any un-
63 Report of the Governor's Commission to Revise the Mental Health Code of Illinois
69 (May 8, 1989). Prison inmates may find it easier to obtain temporary release or parole,
however. Id at 70. See also Note, 83 Harv L Rev at 665 (cited in note 61).
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derlying observations. However, courts should allow lay officers to
relate discrete observations of nontestimonial demeanor. Because
even modest expertise will likely violate a suspect's Fifth Amend-
ment rights, courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption of suffi-
cient expertise.
1. The prevailing testimonial evidence standard.
The Supreme Court has developed a testimonial evidence
analysis that turns on whether the suspect's statement or conduct
explicitly or implicitly asserts some fact, belief, or other informa-
tion in the suspect's mind." In Doe v United States, a majority of
the Court stated that "in order to be testimonial, an accused's
communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual
assertion or disclose information." ' The Court also agreed with
the dissent's view that the accused must not be forced to disclose
his mind's contents .6  More recently, Pennsylvania v Muniz reaf-
firmed the Doe definition, 1 and five Justices attempted to refine
its core meaning: "Whenever a suspect is asked for a response re-
quiring him to communicate an express or implied assertion of fact
or belief, the suspect confronts the 'trilemma' of truth, falsity, or
" Without attempting to resolve the ongoing debate over the true purposes of the self-
incrimination clause, see Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure 697-702 (West, 7th ed 1990), this Comment proceeds from the view that
mental privacy is a core value underlying the privilege against self-incrimination. See, for
example, Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reap-
praisal, 20 Am Crim L Rev 31, 41-42 (1982). The classic litany of the values underlying the
Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule appeared in Murphy v Waterfront Commission, 378 US
52, 55 (1964) (for example, the desire to maintain a fair state-individual balance by requir-
ing the state to shoulder the entire burden, and respect for individual privacy and the invio-
lability of the human personality), but no consensus has emerged favoring any particular
value over the others. One problem with the Murphy framework is that it seems to assume
that only statements can be testimonial, whereas Schmerber confirmed two years later that
assertive actions such as a nod or head-shake also could fit that category. 384 US at 761 n 5.
Like courts, commentators disagree about the test that should be used to distinguish
between real and testimonial evidence. Compare Arenela, 20 Am Crim L Rev at 39, 43
(construing Schmerber as establishing single assertive conduct test), with Note, 30 BC L
Rev at 1036, 1059 (cited in note 36) (construing Schmerber as establishing alternative'pur-
pose-based and substance-based tests). See also Charles G. Geyh, The Testimonial Compo-
nent of the Right Against Self-Incrimination, 36 Cath U L Rev 611, 637 (1987); B. Michael
Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Ev-
idence From A Suspect, 43 S Cal L Rev 597, 611, 626-27 (1970).
65 487 US 201, 210 (1988).
11 Id at 210-11 & n 9, citing Couch v United States, 409 US 322, 328 (1973) (extortion
of information from accused), and Curcio v United States, 354 US 118, 128 (1957) (attempt
to force disclosure of mind's contents implicates the self-incrimination clause).
67 110 S Ct 2638, 2646-47 (1990).
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silence and hence the response (whether based on truth or falsity)
contains a testimonial component."6 8
Under this test, simple distinctions between statements and
conduct are unhelpful. A survey of well-settled examples of real
and testimonial evidence demonstrates that statements are not
necessarily testimonial and that nonverbal conduct may be as tes-
timonial as an oral confession.6 9 Suspects supply real evidence
when they give a voice70 or handwriting71 exemplar. Their ability
to talk or write is a foregone conclusion,7 2 and the statement ex-
tracts no assertion from the suspect's mind-the content of the
words is not probative of guilt. Conversely, the act of producing
subpoenaed documents may be testimonial when it reveals the sus-
pect's knowledge of their existence, location, or authenticity.73
2. Extending the standard to evidence of mens rea and
sanity.
The prevailing test does not readily translate to evidence of
mens rea and sanity. Because the Court has not applied the testi-
monial evidence test to these issues, its primary worry has been
that the government will invade a suspect's mind to extract infor-
mation concerning his factual guilt, not his mens rea or sanity.74
Testimonial evidence has been limited to a suspect's verbal or non-
verbal assertions about the crime. Under this narrow view of the
test, sanity evidence presumably would be testimonial only when it
reflects the defendant's knowledge of his sanity at the time he
committed the crime.
But where interrogation extracts from the suspect's mind com-
municative processes relevant to mental state or sanity, such evi-
dence should be considered testimonial regardless of whether it is
an affirmative assertion. The Court's emphasis on protecting
mental privacy suggests that the key issue is not whether evidence
constitutes an affirmative assertion, but whether it is extracted
68 Id at 2648.
68 Schmerber, 384 US at 761 n 5; Muniz, 110 S Ct at 2647 n 9.
1o United States v Dionisio, 410 US 1, 5-7 (1973).
71 Gilbert v California, 388 US 263, 266-67 (1967).
71 In contrast, sanity is in dispute once the defendant produces some evidence to rebut
the sanity presumption.
73 See United States v Doe, 465 US 605 (1984). Compare Doe v United States, 487 US
201, 219 (1988) (compelling subject of grand jury investigation to authorize foreign banks to
disclose records of his accounts, without identifying those documents or acknowledging their
existence, does not violate subject's privilege).
71 See People v Hager, 69 NY2d 141, 505 NE2d 237, 238 (1987) (per curiam); Brooks v
r'nited States, 494 A2d 922, 924 (DC App 1984).
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from the suspect's mind. Under this broader view of the test, de-
meanor evidence of sanity would be testimonial not only when it
reflects the defendant's knowledge of his sanity, but whenever it
reveals the contents of his mind. Courts should deem evidence tes-
timonial whenever a government interrogator uses expertise to ex-
tract information from the suspect's mind that is probative of his
actus reus, mens rea, or sanity, even though that evidence, if per-
ceived by a lay observer, would fit the ordinary class of real de-
meanor evidence. Both the historical roots of the real evidence cat-
egory and the lower courts' approaches to interrogation scenarios
analogous to Hinckley and Jones lend weight to this view of the
testimonial test.
a) Historical roots of the real evidence category. Accord-
ing to one commentator, the real evidence category developed in
response to advancing forensic science and a concomitant need to
obtain valuable physical evidence from the defendant's body with-
out violating the Fifth Amendment."5 The prosecution would use
this evidence to prove that the defendant was the person who com-
mitted the crime, rather than to assess the mental state with which
he committed it. The state has traditionally used demeanor evi-
dence to prove actus reus. When used in that way, such evidence
does not implicate the contents of the suspect's mind at all.
But when used to prove sanity, demeanor evidence reveals the
mind's contents. This probing of the mind's contents evokes the
testimonial element of Fifth Amendment analysis. The failure to
recognize physiological evidence of mental condition as testimonial
in at least some interrogation scenarios would expand the real evi-
dence "exception" beyond its original purpose. A suspect faces a
"cruel trilemma" 6 when he does not know how to behave, much
less speak, in the face of expert interrogation.
b) Analogous custodial interrogation scenarios. The lower
courts' approaches to polygraph evidence and psychiatric examina-
tion evidence support this broad view of the testimonial standard.
In each of these contexts, expert investigators analyze physical re-
sponses to questioning as an indirect means of asking the suspect
to reveal his mind's contents." The resulting evidence is used to
7' Geyh, 36 Cath U L Rev at 626, 634 (cited in note 64).
78 See Murphy, 378 US at 55.
77 A third analogy is the compelled sobriety test. Unlike polygraph and psychiatric
tests, sobriety tests administered by expert interrogators produce real demeanor evidence.
In Muniz, for example, the Court found the manner in which a defendant speaks to be real
evidence. 110 S Ct 2638 (1990). But intoxication must be distinguished from sanity and
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determine guilt. Lower courts classify this evidence as testimonial,
even though it includes no affirmative assertions by the suspect
about the alleged crime.
Polygraph tests generate testimonial evidence when the inter-
rogator gathers evidence of the suspect's pulse, perspiration, respi-
ration, and other involuntary physiological symptoms of lying.
Even though the interrogator bypasses the suspect's affirmative
participation, the test violates the Fifth Amendment's protection
against forced probing of the mind by measuring physiological re-
sponses to questioning. Lower courts uniformly classify the results
of lie detector tests as testimonial.7 8
Psychological tests requiring vocal responses and active coop-
eration generate testimonial evidence because they compel the de-
fendant to communicate his mental status. The compelled psychi-
atric examination probes a suspect's mind for evidence of mental
condition by analyzing his verbal and physiological responses to
questioning. Lower courts have thus classified such evidence as tes-
timonial.79 It is crucial to recognize that the psychiatric exam uses
not only the contents of statements but also simultaneous de-
meanor evidence to assess sanity. 0 In Gholson v Estelle, the Fifth
mental status-driving while intoxicated is a strict liability offense that depends only on the
suspect's actus reus. See, for example, Ill Rev Stat ch 951/2, § 11-501(a)(1) (1989); People v
Thorson, 145 Ill App 3d 764, 496 NE2d 304, 306 (1986) (interpreting statute). Thus, physi-
cal evidence of intoxication alone does not implicate mental privacy. Muniz itself distin-
guished between real evidence of the manner of speech and testimonial evidence of the sus-
pect's response when asked the date of his sixth birthday. Only the latter is testimonial
because it forced Muniz to communicate his mental impairment. 110 S Ct at 2646. Although
the prosecution did not care about the correct answer, the answer's confused content consti-
tuted a testimonial assertion from which drunkenness could be inferred. Id at 2649.
798 See, for example, Garmon v Lumpkin County, Ga., 878 F2d 1406, 1410 (11th Cir
1989); People v Daniels, 422 NYS2d 832, 842, 102 Misc 2d 540 (S Ct 1979). Truth serum
similarly has been rejected. See, for example, State v Allies, 186 Mont 99, 606 P2d 1043,
1051-52 (1979).
" Before Smith, some courts thought psychiatric exams developed only real evidence.
See, for example, People v Nelson, 92 Ill App 3d 35, 415 NE2d 688, 693 (1980). But Smith
held that when the substance of the defendant's statements (including his silence) affected
the psychiatrist's diagnosis, the resulting testimony revealed testimonial evidence. 451 US at
464, 465. See also Byers, 740 F2d at 1112 (stating that Smith categorically rejected idea that
psychiatric exams do not gather testimonial evidence); Note, 83 Harv L Rev at 652-60 (cited
in note 61) (psychiatric exams gather testimonial evidence because they determine the sub-
ject's ideas, thought patterns, and attitudes).
"0 As one article on psychiatric evaluations explained,
In a pre-arraignment psychiatric examination it is not just "what you say," the content
of communication, that may be used against you. It is how you say it, the emotions you
display, the way they fit or fail to fit with what you say, the degree of logicality of your
thinking, the relationship between your patterns of thought and other data, and even
what you don't say that affect the psychiatrist's report. These are all aspects of the
process of your communication, and are far more fundamental to the psychiatric exam
than the simplistic "what you say."
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Circuit held that physiological reactions elicited by psychiatrists
are testimonial.8 1
The psychiatric examination analogy suggests that a suspect's
demeanor as well as statement contents would result in testimonial
evidence if elicited by a police officer with psychiatric expertise.
Such expertise enables the officer to extract mental status informa-
tion from the suspect by analyzing his responses to interrogation.
3. Applying the standard to police testimony about sanity.
The variety of possible testimony on the issue of sanity com-
plicates the application of the testimonial evidence test. For exam-
ple, a police officer might offer his opinion that the defendant was
sane and then testify to the defendant's demeanor, statements, or
both. Alternatively, the officer might relate only discrete observa-
tions underlying a tacit opinion. Those observations could include
the defendant's statements, or they might be limited to his de-
meanor. Finally, particular demeanor evidence might be real or
testimonial.
As a general matter, opinions must be distinguished from the
observations that support them. The line between opinions and
underlying observations may be as difficult to draw as the line sep-
arating testimonial and real evidence. For example, the observation
that the suspect seemed or acted "normal" or "rational" ap-
proaches an opinion that the suspect was sane. In contrast, the ob-
servation that the suspect was "quiet" or "calm" may lack the
more conclusory connotation of testimony concerning normalcy.
Courts might identify opinions by asking whether any expertise
was involved in making the observation and whether the police of-
Randolph A. Read, Can a "Psychiatric Miranda" Work? A California Perspective, 14
Rutgers L J 431, 435-36 (1983) (emphasis in original). See also Schneider v Lynaugh, 835
F2d 570, 573 (5th Cir 1988) (psychiatrist indicated that in determining sanity he considered
five categories: general physical appearance and behavior; manner of speaking; facial expres-
sions reflecting emotional state; ability to express thoughts; and orientation as to time,
place, and person).
81 675 F2d 734, 739-40 (5th Cir 1982). The Gholson court left open the possibility that
conclusions based only on a defendant's facial expressions or other physical behavior might
sustain the physical evidence analogy. Id at 740-41. But an absence of compulsion, express
or implied, would render the testimonial inquiry unnecessary and would fall outside the
police interrogation scenario in Hinckley and Jones. Moreover, an expert cannot reach an
opinion without comparing statement contents to abstract demeanor. Donald W. Goodwin
and Samuel B. Guze, Psychiatric Diagnosis 301-08 (Oxford, 4th ed 1989) (to analyze mental
status, psychiatrist should examine appearance and behavior, form and'content of thought,
affect and mood, memory and intellectual functioning, and insight and judgment).
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ficer was expressing some conclusion as opposed to mere support
for an unstated opinion.2
A court clearly would not admit an opinion based on com-
pelled, testimonial evidence under the Fifth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule. An opinion based solely on real evidence, in contrast,
would survive Fifth Amendment scrutiny, and a court would sub-
ject it only to the law of evidence. As the Court reasoned in Smith
and as Judge Clark reasoned in Jones, a judge would have to ex-
clude an opinion based on both real and testimonial evidence com-
pelled from the suspect.8 Of course, the inadmissibility of an opin-
ion would not automatically render the underlying observations
inadmissible. The two-tier hierarchy requires that the court deter-
mine the admissibility of any opinion testimony only after analyz-
ing the admissibility of discrete observations that underlie the
opinion.
Evidence that could form the basis for a conclusion about the
defendant's sanity may be subdivided into several categories: (1)
verbal statements used for the truth of their substance (e.g., "I was
sane when I shot the victim."); (2) verbal statements used for their
substance regardless of truth (e.g., "I wield Satan's power."); (3)
manner of verbalizations (e.g., slurred, rapid, loud); (4) voluntary,
assertive behavior (e.g., facial expressions, nodding, pointing, cry-
ing); and (5) involuntary, nonassertive behavior (e.g., sweating,
blushing, sneezing). A possible sixth category could include the ab-
sence of the foregoing types of conduct, namely silence and/or still-
ness.8 4 Categories one and two indisputably constitute testimonial
evidence, while categories three through six are varieties of de-
meanor evidence 5 that are more difficult to classify as real or
testimonial. 86
81 See also FRE 701 (use of opinion by lay witness limited to those rationally based on
his perception and helpful to understanding of testimony).
9 Unlike a partially invalid search warrant which may be "redacted" so that evidence
obtained pursuant to valid, severable portions of the warrant need not be suppressed (see
United States v Christine, 687 F2d 749, 758 (3d Cir 1982)), evidence of a defendant's state-
ments and nontestimonial demeanor obtained in violation of Miranda cannot be so easily
parsed.
84 The Fourteenth Amendment would often prohibit use of this evidence. Wainwright v
Greenfield, 474 US 284, 295 (1986). See note 55.
85 The Supreme Court has never explicitly defined demeanor as a body of evidence, and
it would seem impossible to treat demeanor evidence as a unitary class. Nevertheless, courts
appear to use "demeanor" to mean any manifestations of physical or emotional behavior
other than the content of oral statements. See note 1.
88 There is also a category of real evidence that is not demeanor: aspects of the body
that reflect no conduct by the suspect, -uch as blood, a tattoo, a scar, or a crooked nose.
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Consistent with the testimonial standard "developed above,
courts should classify categories three through six as testimonial
based on the expertise of the interrogator:, evidence is testimonial
if the interrogator extracts it from the defendant's mind through
his psychiatric expertise. A piece of evidence is testimonial not by
its nature alone, but also by the context of its, acquisition.
a) Interrogator expertise as a means of classifying testi-
mony. A police officer lacking psychiatric expertise, such as the
detective in Jones, is unable to engage in the type of diagnostic
probing done by a psychiatrist. The suspect accordingly needs less
Fifth Amendment protection with respect to his physiological re-
sponses to questioning, but as much if not more protection with
respect to the substance of his verbal responses. This is because
the police officer must rely mainly on the suspect's statements in
forming an opinion about the suspect's sanity.87 The court would
have to exclude the officer's opinion because the statement's sub-
stance-which is concededly testimonial regardless of
truthSS8-would be the primary basis for that opinion. Thus, courts
should limit police officers without psychiatric expertise to relating
discrete observations of the suspect's demeanor underlying their
tacit opinions."9 This demeanor evidence could include both invol-
untary, nonassertive behavior and the manner of the suspect's
speech (i.e., everything short of statement contents and voluntary,
assertive behavior).
As Hinckley shows, however, some law enforcement officers
may have considerable psychiatric expertise. FBI agents, unlike
typical police officers, are highly trained to prevent and investigate
assassination attempts on major political figures.90 Such agents are
acutely aware of the importance of their testimony about a sus-
pect's demeanor, and can also anticipate that suspects they arrest
may have mental problems. 91 With expert officers, as with a gov-
ernment psychiatrist, the state's coercive power takes on a new di-
Unlike the previous six categories, the suspect does not produce this type of evidence in
response to interrogation or other stimulus.
87 Jones, 839 F2d at 1449-50 (Clark dissenting).
88 See Muniz, 110 S Ct at 2646.
89 Courts disagree on the evidentiary standards for admissibility of lay sanity opinions.
Contrast Commonwealth v Monico, 396 Mass 793, 488 NE2d 1168, 1175 (1986) (inadmissi-
ble), with Denham v State, 574 SW2d 129, 131 (Tex Crim App 1978) (en banc) (admissible).
The Michigan Supreme Court has held that lay sanity opinions are competent even to rebut
expert opinions. People v Murphy, 416 Mich 453, 331 NW2d 152, 157-58 (1982). Of course,
constitutional requirements trump evidentiary considerations.
90 Hinckley, 672 F2d at 133.
9" Id at 133-34.
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mension. Unlike the average officer whose coercive powers can un-
cover only evidence of actus reus and specific intent, the expert
officer may be able to compel communicative sanity evidence from
the suspect. 2-
If the interrogator makes the suspect speak (even without us-
ing questions about the crime's details) in order to judge the coher-
ence of the suspect, testimonial evidence would result. If the inter-
rogator's questions caused the suspect to squirm, sweat, or make
other involuntary responses, those responses too would be testimo-
nial, similar to the physiological responses to a polygraph test.
Thus, any observations made by an expert officer should be consid-
ered testimonial and should be excluded as violative of the Fifth
Amendment. And since the court cannot admit the expert officer's
observations in such a case, it likewise should exclude his opinions
based upon them.
b) Assessing officer expertise. Once courts understand the
importance of an officer's expertise in classifying his testimony re-
garding sanity, they need a method to assess that expertise in a
given case. Expertise may be gauged in terms of two requirements:
ability and opportunity. 3 Police officers in most jurisdictions have
received only brief mental health training.9 4 But studies indicate
that the state can fairly easily train officers "to recognize psycho-
pathology and to report it accurately."9 Therefore, most police of-
ficers will likely possess some training and experience with unsta-
ble persons,96 and, if they have such expertise, they will almost
certainly use it. This is not to say that the typical police officer's
11 Of course, any officer might provoke the same reactions, but only the expert officer
would notice and understand their significance. Furthermore, the expert officer's questions
might be geared to the discovery of sanity evidence.
"' Under the law of evidence, expertise is generally ascertained by assessing the wit-
ness's qualifications, such as knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education. See FRE
702.
" Craig Fisher, ed, Police Ill-Equipped to Handle the Mentally Ill, Study Finds, 17
Crim Justice Newsletter 5 (May, 1986) (police recruits average only 4.3 hours of mental
health training).
95 Samuel S. Janus, et al, Training Police Officers to Distinguish Mental Illness, 137
Am J Psychiatry 228, 229 (1980) (officers who received 16 hours of lectures, case material,
and films significantly outscored control group in describing subjects' appearance, behavior,
speech, and other characteristics). See also Marc Levinson and M. K. Distefano, Jr., Effects
of Brief Training on Mental Health Knowledge and Attitudes of Law Enforcement Of-
ficers, 7 J Police Sci & Admin 241, 242, 244 (1979) (13 hours of classroom training, two
hours of testing, and one-hour tour of mental hospital improved knowledge and attitudes to
the level of mental hospital attendants).
" Ninety-four percent of officers in one survey reported contact with mentally ill peo-
ple. See id at 241.
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ability to diagnose sanity or insanity will equal that of a forensic
psychiatrist. Frequent contact with mentally ill people does not
mean that officers can classify a person who is on the margin be-
tween insanity and a lesser form of mental illness. One commenta-
tor has noted that even an expert psychiatrist needs at least two
hour-long interviews involving multiple tests to develop sufficient
data for an evaluation.97
But the typical officer will have enough expertise to jeopardize
a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. For example, cer-
tain screening questions can help non-psychiatrists decide quickly
the relative abnormality of a suspect's mental state."' Furthermore,
lay persons with just minimal training can administer some stan-
dardized structured interviews in an hour or less. They can then
convey detailed and reliable descriptions of the subject's responses
and behavior to experts to complete the diagnosis. 9 Thus, courts
should use a rebuttable presumption of expertise.
In order to rebut the expertise presumption, the prosecution
would have to show that the testifying officer either lacked the
ability to distinguish mental illness or lacked sufficient opportunity
to do so. The prosecution could attack ability by presenting aca-
demic and employment records devoid of training and experience
concerning mental illness. Although everyday contact with unsta-
ble persons, by itself, would not prevent an officer from establish-
ing lay status, any formal instruction about how to identify specific
mental disorders would vitiate the rebuttal. The prosecution could
attack opportunity by presenting testimony or records (such as an
audio-videotape) concerning the specific interrogation. This show-
ing would be difficult, if not impossible, because an expert officer
can violate a suspect's rights even without extracting enough infor-
mation to formulate an opinion (which would be inadmissible any-
way). Therefore, the prosecution should have to prove that regard-
less of the interrogation's duration, the questions posed to the
suspect were so few or benign that they did not elicit reactions
useful for psychiatric diagnosis. Ability, then, would be the more
effective line of attack. 00
9 See Beis, Mental Health and the Law at 243 (cited in note 11).
98 Goodwin and Guze, Psychiatric Diagnosis at 294, 308-09 (cited in note 81).
" Scott Wetzler and Martin M. Katz, Contemporary Approaches to Psychological As-
sessment 92, 94 (Brunner/Mazel, 1989) (DIS and IMPS tests).
100 The presumption of expertise might seem incongruous because it requires the gov-
ernment to attack the professional ability of one of its own officers and thus risk undermin-
ing the government's own image and other testimony of its witness. This harm can be mini-
mized, if not eliminated, by determining expertise in camera. Furthermore, no disincentive
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IV. POLICE-OBTAINED SANITY EVIDENCE AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Even if incriminating and testimonial, police-obtained evi-
dence of sanity is admissible if it comes within an exception to the
exclusionary rule. Both the waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence
doctrine and the insanity rebuttal exception seek to give the prose-
cution a fair opportunity to rebut the defendant's insanity evi-
dence. However, courts should apply neither exception to evidence
obtained by police in violation of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation because each goes too far in the prosecution's favor.
A. Waiver Doctrine
Unlike capital sentencing proceedings in which the prosecu-
tion has the burden of proving future dangerousness, a sanity de-
termination generally requires a defendant to present expert testi-
mony on his own behalf. The defendant's initiative then invites the
prosecution not only to obtain and use psychiatric testimony in re-
buttal, but also to argue that courts should include police-obtained
evidence within the ambit of the waiver doctrine. Such a broad
waiver doctrine is unjustified, however, because it would have ret-
roactive effect and would give the state a disproportionate advan-
tage over the defendant.
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutional-
ity of a blanket waiver to objections against psychiatric or other
evidence, Buchanan v Kentucky'01 offers some support for such a
waiver doctrine. There, the Court held that a defendant who re-
quests a mental examination and tries to establish a mental status
defense at trial waives his constitutional objection to rebuttal evi-
dence in the form of findings from the exam he requested. No Mi-
randa warnings were necessary as long as the defendant raised the
issue at trial and the prosecution presented no inculpatory state-
ments with the findings. 0 2 Several courts have specifically indi-
to train officers "formally" would emerge because expert officers who observe required pro-
cedural safeguards can give valuable testimony.
101 483 US 402 (1987).
1* Id at 423-24. The Court recently expressed timid approval of this holding in Powell
v Texas, 109 S Ct 3146, 3149 (1989) (dictum).
Buchanan and similar cases support the constitutionality of Rule 12.2 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and state analogues requiring defendants to advise the govern-
ment of their intent to plead insanity and to submit to a court-ordered (i.e., compelled)
government psychiatric examination. Rule 12.2(c) states that evidence from such a com-
pelled exam is inadmissible on the issue of guilt and is admissible only on an issue of mental
condition when the defendant first raises the issue. FRCrP 12.2(c). The ABA also endorses
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cated that the waiver applies retroactively to permit rebuttal testi-
mony based on exams that preceded the defendant's decision to
raise an insanity or other mental status defense.103 Theoretically,
courts could extend this view to encompass sanity evidence ob-
tained by police at the time of a suspect's arrest.
No court, however, appears to have extended the waiver doc-
trine to admit police-obtained evidence. If it were so extended, the
defendant might have to rely on lay testimony to place his sanity
in issue.10 4 And when the defendant retained the burden of proving
his insanity, he would have to choose between his constitutional
right to present exculpatory evidence and his constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
One might infer that evidence from an exam requested by the
defendant raises no Fifth Amendment objection because, by defini-
tion, the defendent voluntarily provides it. But, as the Buchanan
dissent pointed out, an exam requested for the purpose of ob-
taining interim treatment may not yield voluntary evidence for the
purpose of determining ultimate moral culpability for an alleged
crime. 10 5 The real rationale for permitting rebuttal with compelled
sanity evidence seems to be a policy conclusion that expert testi-
mony, however obtained, is the government's only effective re-
sponse to the insanity defense. 06
Courts have not universally accepted the waiver doctrine, and
Buchanan is limited. In Byers, for example, Judge Scalia called the
waiver theory "at best a fiction" where the relinquishment of Fifth
Amendment privileges is not voluntary but the result of a court-
this view. ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards § 7-3.4 at 88-95 (ABA, 1989).
Aside from the absence of retroactive effect, one argument for why rules like 12.2(c) do not
raise Fifth Amendment problems is the underlying notion, explored and rejected above, that
evidence of sanity is not "incriminating" within the meaning of the. privilege against self-
incrimination. See, for example, United States v Steinberg, 428 F Supp 77 (D Conn 1977).
'03 See Granviel, 881 F2d at 190 (admitting results of pre-arrest examination performed
when defendant was a juvenile); Madrid, 673 F2d at 1120-21 (admitting testimony based
partly on competency exam); State v Jones, 111 Wash 2d 239, 759 P2d 1183, 1187 (1988)
(en banc); Hicks v State, 256 Ga 715, 352 SE2d 762, 772 n 5 (1987):
'0" An insanity defense relying solely on lay testimony is considerably less likely to suc-
ceed, Brown v Butler, 876 F2d 427, 431 (5th Cir 1989), and may even be insufficient to place
the defendant's sanity in issue. See Case Note, Criminal Law-Defense of Insanity-Lay
Witness Testimony Is Insufficient to Introduce the Issue of Defendant's Sanity, 62 U De-
troit L Rev 543 (1985).
105 483 US at 426, 431-33 (Marshall dissenting).
18 Buchanan may also rest on the testimonial waiver analogy. The state may argue
that a defendant has no unlimited constitutional right to an insanity defense, and therefore
the state may burden the use of that defense just as it may burden the defendant's right to
testify in court. See White, 74 J Crim L & Criminol at 954-63 (cited in note 10).
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decreed condition. 10 The doctrine has not been applied when the
defendant used only lay witnesses to place his sanity in issue.108
Nor have courts applied it to a mere plea of insanity. 0 9 Finally,
courts may easily limit Buchanan's holding to the admission of re-
sults of exams requested by the defendant when represented by
counsel, at which point the "waiver" can more properly be deemed
both voluntary and intelligent.
Even if courts can justify the waiver doctrine for psychiatric
rebuttal evidence, however, they should not apply it to police-
obtained evidence. First, the doctrine should not apply retroac-
tively to either expert or lay sanity evidence obtained illegally.
While several courts have admitted evidence from psychiatric ex-
ams preceding the defendant's insanity plea, or even his arrest,110
at least one court carefully indicated that its approval of the
waiver doctrine depended on admitting only that privileged infor-
mation obtained after notice of the insanity defense."' Because
courts ordinarily find waivers of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation only when a party acts knowingly and voluntarily,"2 it is
difficult to see how a defendant could meet those conditions before
he decides to plead insanity, much less before he obtains
representation." 3
Second, even if the waiver doctrine applies retroactively to
mental examinations by expert psychiatrists, it should not extend
to custodial interrogations by police. The Hinckley court distin-
guished police interrogations on the ground that they lack proce-
107 740 F2d at 1113. See also State v Huff, 325 NC 1, 381 SE2d 635, 660 n 9 (1989), cert
granted and judgment as to sentencing vacated and remanded on other grounds, 110 S Ct
3266 (1990); White, 74 J Crim L & Criminol at 948-49 (cited in note 10).
108 Compare Brown v Butler, 876 F2d 427, 430 (5th Cir 1989) (witnesses were not ex-
perts), with Schneider v Lynaugh, 835 F2d 570, 576 (5th Cir 1988) (witnesses were experts).
109 Battie v Estelle, 655 F2d 692, 702 (5th Cir 1981); White, 74 J Crim L & Criminol at
961 n 85 (cited in note 10).
110 See note 103.
1 Sturgis v Goldsmith, 796 F2d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir 1986).
112 See Culombe v Connecticut, 367 US 568, 602 (1961) (requiring waiver to be "free
and unconstrained"). Although a truly insane defendant arguably could never make any
intelligent waiver, his attorney could make strategic decisions on the defendant's behalf.
113 Limiting the prosecution to evidence obtained after the defendant notifies it of his
intent to plead insanity need not place the state at a disadvantage. Rules such as FRCrP
12.2 are specifically designed to give the prosecution sufficient advance notice to prepare to
meet the insanity defense. If there is a risk that defense counsel might delay the decision
whether to plead insanity so as to increase the time between the alleged crime and the state
psychiatrist's diagnosis, and thereby to reduce the probative value of that diagnosis, a pro-
cedural rule could be added to expedite that decision. This delay also is unlikely because
defense counsel will often request a psychiatric evaluation to secure treatment pending trial,
and a prompt competency examination is also probable.
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dural safeguards that normally accompany compelled mental ex-
ams." 4 Since psychiatrists and police officers both pressure
suspects, often by subtle means, the circuit court's distinction
seems weak.
But there is another, more persuasive reason to distinguish po-
lice interrogations. The main policy justification for the waiver by
offer of psychiatric evidence doctrine is that, as in the analogous
testimonial waiver context, adversarial proceedings must maintain
a fair state-individual balance. This balance requires not only that
the law protect the individual from overbearing state power, but
also that the state have a fair opportunity to meet the suspect's
defense. Courts have often mentioned the state's desperate need
for expert psychiatric evidence as the only effective means to rebut
defense experts."' Yet, conceding that the state should have a fair
opportunity to examine the defendant does not a fortiori require
the admissibility of any and all sanity evidence, however obtained.
The use of illegally obtained police testimony to rebut an in-
sanity defense would violate the proportionality test and would
give the state an improper advantage. Just as an offer of lay sanity
evidence does not waive objections to expert rebuttal evidence, an
offer of expert sanity evidence should not waive objections to all
government-obtained rebuttal evidence. The likelihood that a po-
lice officer not qualified as a psychiatric expert would contribute
evidence that might unduly sway a jury leads to a disproportionate
impact on the defendant. Moreover, the waiver theory developed
in an era when most jurisdictions only required the defendant to
produce some evidence to rebut the sanity presumption and make
the prosecution carry the burden of proving sanity beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. After Hinckley, numerous jurisdictions (including
the federal courts) shifted the burden to the defendant to prove
insanity by a preponderance of, or even clear and convincing, evi-
dence." 6 Subsequent waiver decisions have not considered this
shift in the power balance, but it seems especially persuasive in
supporting the argument that courts should not extend the waiver
doctrine to police testimony.
114 672 F2d at 133 a 116.
115 See, for example, United States v Cohen, 530 F2d 43, 48 (5th Cir 1976); United
States v Albright, 388 F2d 719, 724 (4th Cir 1968); State v Whitlow, 45 NJ 3, 210 A2d 763,
767 (1965).
116 See, for example, Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 USC § 17(b) (1988) (clear
and convincing); Ill Rev Stat ch 38, § 6-2(e) (1989) (preponderance). Some jurisdictions also
narrowed the test for insanity. See, for example, 18 USC § 17(a) (1988) (mental disease or
defect must be "severe").
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B. Insanity Rebuttal Exception
If the Fifth Amendment and its exclusionary rule are properly
understood, there is no room for an insanity rebuttal exception.
Nevertheless, several courts and commentators have endorsed such
an exception either by combining the impeachment exception with
a testimony-by-proxy theory, or by invoking the sheer practical
need for rebuttal testimony to offset the difficulty of disproving
insanity. As the Hinckley court held, however, these justifications
are flawed.
The impeachment exception is not available where, as posited
in this Comment, the defendant does not testify. But at least one
court has endorsed a testimony-by-proxy theory to support an in-
sanity rebuttal exception to the exclusionary rule. In People v
Finkey,117 an Illinois appellate court held that a statement ob-
tained by police in violation of Miranda was admissible to rebut
expert testimony that the defendant suffered from pathological in-
toxication. Although Finkey did not testify at trial, the court be-
lieved that the impeachment rationale applied because the trial
judge admitted Finkey's statements to police only in rebuttal and
after he instructed the jury to consider them only as they related
to Finkey's state of mind. "Just as a defendant cannot be allowed
to directly perjure himself and then hide behind the fifth amend-
ment," the court concluded, "he cannot be allowed to prima facie
establish an insanity defense by his representations to a psychia-
trist without affording the State an opportunity to challenge the
veracity of those statements."'18 This holding implicitly approved
the testimony-by-proxy theory rejected in Hinckley.
Arguments favoring an insanity rebuttal exception stem from
deep distrust of the insanity defense and the prosecution's diffi-
culty in rebutting it. Thus, the exception could help defeat fraudu-
lent insanity defenses by equalizing the available proof on the san-
ity issue and by challenging dubious testimony by proxy.
Furthermore, police lack the same incentive to violate suspects'
constitutional rights after obtaining evidence of guilt. Finally, the
trier of fact arguably needs all available evidence to make an in-
formed decision about the defendant's sanity."19
117 105 M App 3d 230, 434 NE2d 18 (1982).
118 434 NE2d at 20.
1 These arguments are advanced in Comment, The Use of Illegally Obtained Evi-
dence to Rebut the Insanity Defense: A New Exception to the Exclusionary Rule?, 74 J
Crim L & Criminol 391, 417-25 (1983). See also Daley and Fryklund, 21 Valparaiso U L Rev
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Despite these arguments, an insanity rebuttal exception to the
Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule is unwarranted. 20 First, as in
the "waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence" context, shifting the
burden of proof on the sanity issue to the defendant undermines
the state's argument that it needs illegally obtained evidence to
rebut the insanity defense. The prosecution also should be able to
obtain sanity evidence from -other sources, such as booking officers
and additional lay witnesses.' 2 '
More importantly, however, the testimony-by-proxy theory is
fatally flawed. Testimony by a defense psychiatrist does not equate
precisely with the defendant's testimony because the psychiatrist's
evaluation filters the defendant's story. The credibility of that
story is therefore more properly tested by cross-examining the psy-
chiatrist who testifies in court. 22
The testimony-by-proxy theory is analogous to the perjury-by-
proxy theory rejected by the Supreme Court in James v Illinois.12
In James, the Court decided not to enlarge the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule's impeachment exception to permit the
prosecution to use illegally obtained evidence to impeach the testi-
mony of defense witnesses other than the defendant. The Illinois
Supreme Court had expressly adopted a perjury-by-proxy theory
for expanding the impeachment exception to admit any part of a
suppressed statement short of a confession. But five Justices re-
jected the perjury-by-proxy theory and refused to permit the im-
peachment exception where the defendant did not testify.
The Court's decision in James probably means that to the ex-
tent that the insanity rebuttal exception to the Fifth Amendment
exclusionary rule would rely on a perjury-by-proxy or testimony-
by-proxy theory, the Court would reject it. With respect to a trial's
guilt phase, the perjury-by-proxy theory says that a defendant
at 500 (cited in note 11) (arguing for the admissibility of a defendant's post-arrest behavior
to rebut his testimony through psychiatric expert proxies).
120 Some theorists would argue that a debate about the viability of the testimony-by-
proxy theory completely misses the mark because, contrary to Supreme Court decisions like
Harris, truth-seeking and deterrence of police misconduct are not the only rationales under-
lying the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule. Rather, the Fifth Amendment guarantees de-
fendants an absolute procedural right of exclusion, and no exceptions at all are defensible.
See, for example, Loewy, 87 Mich L Rev at 908 (cited in note 15); Bostjan M. Zupancic, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 1981 Ariz St L J 1. On this view, the Harris impeach-
ment exception has no place at all in insanity rebuttal analysis. Notwithstanding these criti-
cisms, the Court continues to balance the privilege against self-incrimination against other
systemic interests. See, for example, James v Illinois, 110 S Ct 648 (1990).
21 Daley and Fryklund, 21 Valparaiso U L Rev at 524 (cited in note 11); Note, 83 Harv
L Rev at 670-71 (cited in note 61).
122 White, 74 J Crim L & Criminol at 985 (cited in note 10).
123 110 S Ct 648.
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should not be able to avoid impeachment with unconstitutionally
obtained evidence by putting a friendly witness on the stand to
testify erroneously in his favor. The James majority found this
theory unpersuasive because the threat of perjury prosecution de-
ters a witness more than it deters a defendant already facing con-
viction for the underlying offense. 24 More importantly, perhaps,
the majority also feared that "expanding the impeachment excep-
tion to encompass the testimony of all defense witnesses likely
would chill some defendants from presenting their best de-
fense-and sometimes any defense at all-through the testimony
of others."' 25 Finally, the deterrent effect on police misconduct
would be weakened.2 6
Just as the James majority rejected the perjury-by-proxy the-
ory for a trial's guilt phase, courts should reject the testimony-by-
proxy theory for the sanity phase. The chilling effect would be par-
ticularly strong in the sanity context because the defendant might
risk losing his only defense to avoid execution. The disadvantage
to the insanity defendant would be especially harsh because, unlike
James, he is in a weaker position to offer patently false informa-
tion through a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist need not lie to pre-
sent favorable testimony, and his view of the defendant's sanity is
less likely to be intentionally erroneous than an actus reus alibi
reported by a friendly defense witness.127
The James majority also disagreed that excluding illegally ob-
tained evidence from the prosecution's case-in-chief would provide
sufficient deterrence. When police officers have gathered ample
proof of a suspect's actus reus from lay witnesses and evidence at
the crime scene, they will have little to lose and much to gain by
illegally interrogating the suspect. In James, the detectives who
unlawfully detained James already knew of several eyewitnesses to
the crime; similarly, in Hinckley, the FBI agents surely were aware
that numerous bystanders had witnessed the assassination at-
tempt. Thus, although the deterrence rationale may not be funda-
mental to the Fifth Amendment's per se exclusionary rule, proper
regard for deterrence weighs heavily against an insanity rebuttal
exception.
124 Id at 658. Of course, an expert psychiatrist testifying for the defense and offering
opinion testimony about the defendant's mental status runs virtually no risk of perjury.
125 Id at 659.
126 Id.
127 This vitiates Justice Kennedy's complaint that the James majority ignored the "al-
most certain knowledge that the testimony immunized from rebuttal is false." Id at 665
(Kennedy dissenting).
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
CONCLUSION
In order properly to apply the Fifth Amendment exclusionary
rule to police-obtained evidence of sanity, courts should reject (at
least in part) four major theories heretofore used to justify rebut-
ting the insanity defense with evidence obtained in violation of Mi-
randa: non-incriminating; non-testimonial; waiver; and an insanity
rebuttal exception.
First, courts should reject the argument that evidence of san-
ity is not incriminating. Evidence that exposes a defendant to
qualitatively worse imprisonment (or even death) than hospitaliza-
tion should be deemed incriminating under Smith.
Second, depending on the expertise with which a police inter-
rogator probes the defendant's mind for sanity evidence, courts
should treat certain evidentiary products of that interrogation as
testimonial. Regardless of the officer's expertise,' they should ex-
clude lis opinions. A lay officer unavoidably will incorporate the
defendant's statements into his opinion as a witness, contrary to
the prohibition on using compelled, incriminating, testimonial evi-
dence. An expert officer, like a psychiatrist, theoretically might be
able to reach a substandard expert opinion based only on de-
meanor observations. But since courts should view compelled
physiological reactions as testimonial, like statement contents, they
ought to exclude such an opinion. And in the expert officer's case,
even the underlying demeanor observations should be excluded.
Some police officers will lack psychiatric expertise, however,
and courts should therefore permit their testimony concerning the
discrete observations underlying their tacit opinion. This testi-
mony may have considerably less weight before the jury, but may
nonetheless corroborate the prosecution's expert psychiatric testi-
mony. Courts therefore should answer the constitutional admissi-
bility question by determining the relative expertise of the law en-
forcement officer whose testimony the prosecution seeks to admit.
Finally, where police-obtained evidence of sanity is at once
compelled, incriminating, and testimonial, the courts should per-
mit no exceptions to the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule for
insanity rebuttal purposes. Courts should refrain from extending
the waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence doctrine to police rebut-
tal testimony because the state-individual balance would become
skewed in the state's favor. This power transfer would be particu-
larly egregious in those jurisdictions where the defendant now has
the burden of proof on insanity.
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Similar policy concerns should discourage courts from adopt-
ing a narrow insanity rebuttal exception to the exclusionary rule.
The testimony-by-proxy theory in the sanity context is as flawed
as the perjury-by-proxy theory rejected in James. And where the
government already can compel a psychiatric examination for re-
buttal purposes, there is insufficient need and justification for
broadening the impeachment exception to admit police-obtained
sanity evidence when the defendant declines to testify. Courts
should not interpret the Fifth Amendment as allowing the govern-
ment to overcome the highly controversial insanity defense by in-
troducing procedurally tainted police testimony.

